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When a portion of institutional investors are prohibited from short selling, news that
generates differences of opinions also affects information acquisition. Investors facing a short-
sale prohibition (e.g., mutual funds) acquire less information when the sentiment of news
is positive, as positive sentiment increases the likelihood that they will be unable to trade.
Also, prices are more informative following news with negative sentiment than news with
positive sentiment. These novel predictions are tested empirically using new measures of
information acquisition derived from a hand-collected sample of mutual fund and hedge
fund IP addresses. When the sentiment of recent news has been negative instead of positive,
information acquisition by mutual funds increases by 16% relative to hedge funds, and prices
are up to 14% more informative.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Investors acquire information hoping to profitably trade upon it. However, in many
settings, investors face constraints that inhibit their ability to trade on the information they
acquire. One constraint commonly faced by institutional investors is a prohibition on short
sales: up to 73% of mutual funds face such a restriction.1 While it is known that short-
sale prohibitions generally reduce incentives to acquire information, the conditions under
which this prohibition is most likely to bind, and therefore attenuate information acquisition,
are less understood.2 Further, unconstrained investors potentially modify their information
acquisition due to short-sale prohibitions faced by others, though this relationship is also
unclear. This paper expands our understanding of information acquisition by highlighting
an important interaction between short-sale prohibitions and recent news. In particular,
information acquisition is conditional on the sentiment of recent news when it generates
disagreement amongst investors.
To demonstrate this relationship, this paper extends the classic setting of Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980) by (i) imposing a short-sale prohibition on a subset of potentially informed
investors, and (ii) adding an initial stage in which the sentiment of news generates disagree-
ment. From the perspective of potentially informed investors, this sentiment leads prices
to predictably diverge from their estimate of the asset’s fundamental value. When the sen-
timent of news leads constrained investors to be relatively pessimistic, they expect to be
bound by their short-sale prohibition. Anticipating that they may be unable to trade, fewer
1Almazan, Brown, Carlson and Chapman (2004). Using Yahoo’s mutual fund screener and accounting for
mutual funds with at least $100 million in net assets shows that there are up to 50 times as many mutual
funds in the large, mid, and small stock categories as there are in the long-short category. When accounting
for funds having at least $500 million or $1 billion in assets, the ratio is as high as 86 and 140.
2Nezafat, Schroder and Wang (2017) shows that short-sale constraints adversely affect private information
acquisition.
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constrained investors become informed. In response, more unconstrained investors acquire
information. In summary, the model predicts that news with positive sentiment will induce
relatively less information acquisition from mutual funds (the constrained investors) and
more from hedge funds (the unconstrained). The model also predicts that prices will be less
informative when investors expect to be constrained as aggregate information acquisition is
reduced.
To test the predictions from the model, this paper uses a hand-collected dataset that
measures information acquisition by mutual funds and hedge funds. This dataset was cre-
ated using records of activity on the EDGAR filing system, the SEC’s online repository
for public information. Using a proprietary sample of unmasked IP addresses, I refine the
EDGAR data in order to produce measures of information acquisition that distinguish be-
tween mutual funds and hedge funds. This provides a unique environment in which to test
the predictions from the model. Empirical analysis verifies the model’s main predictions by
showing that relative to hedge funds, mutual funds request less information from EDGAR
when the sentiment of recent news has been positive. Additionally, when more IP addresses
from mutual funds and hedge funds are acquiring information, prices more closely reflect
fundamental value.
An overview of the underlying theory is useful to develop intuition for these results. A
single risky asset exists in random supply. There are three types of investors in the market:
mutual funds, hedge funds, and retail. Mutual funds and hedge funds (together referred
to as institutional investors) can acquire costly private information prior to trading. Retail
investors cannot. On the other hand, mutual funds cannot short sell, while hedge funds
and retail investors are unconstrained. All agents maximize expected profits, subject to a
quadratic inventory cost, and trade by submitting limit orders in a competitive market.
There are three dates. At time zero, all investors observe a public signal that is orthogonal
to the asset’s payoff. Retail investors erroneously consider the signal to be informative and
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use it to update their beliefs about the payoff.3 This creates a difference of opinions between
institutional and retail investors. Subsequent to observing the initial signal, institutional
investors endogenously determine whether to acquire costly private information. Finally,
investors trade, with institutional investors rationally updating given the price.4
Institutional investors consider the impact the initial signal will have on retail investors
when deciding whether to become informed. They do this because the signal provides infor-
mation regarding the likelihood that mutual funds will be bound by the short-sale prohibi-
tion. For example, when the initial signal is positive, retail investors believe the payoff will
be higher than institutional investors believe it will be. From the perspective of institutional
investors, demand from retail investors will, in expectation, push the price of the asset above
its fundamental value. Thus, it is likely that mutual funds will be bound by their short-sale
prohibition. Faced with the prospect of acquiring information they cannot utilize, fewer mu-
tual funds learn. In response to this, more hedge funds will choose to become informed due
to the substitutability of information acquisition. This example highlights the key channel
at work in the model: institutional investors condition their information acquisition on the
initial signal since it drives disagreement with retail investors, thereby providing valuable
information as to whether mutual funds will be bound by their short-sale prohibition.
The model predicts that, relative to hedge funds, fewer mutual funds will acquire infor-
mation when retail investors are relatively optimistic. Additionally, the model highlights an
asymmetry in the substitutability of information acquisition. When deciding whether to ac-
quire information, the chief concern of mutual funds is whether the initial signal will trigger
their short-sale prohibition. This relationship holds regardless of the existence or information
acquisition of hedge funds. On the other hand, when mutual funds are excluded from the
model, information acquisition by hedge funds is invariant to the initial signal. Hedge funds
3Similar specifications for retail investors are used in Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam and Titman (2006), Mendel
and Shleifer (2012), Banerjee and Green (2015), and Crouzet, Dew-Becker and Nathanson (2018).
4Institutional investors update using insights from Breon-Drish (2015) since the price is non-linear. Consis-
tent with differences of opinions models, the retail investors do not update on the price. This is equivalent
to them assuming that institutional investors receive signals that are just noise.
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are primarily concerned with the signal to the extent that it influences the information ac-
quisition of mutual funds. Thus, the model predicts that hedge fund information acquisition
is more sensitive to that of mutual funds than vice versa.
Since the initial signal (i) provides information about whether mutual funds will be able
to trade and (ii) influences both mutual fund and hedge fund information acquisition, the
initial signal also influences the information content of prices. At first glance, the relationship
between price informativeness and the initial signal is unclear. While a positive signal
generates less information acquisition from mutual funds, it simultaneously increases the
amount of information acquired by hedge funds. However, mutual funds are more sensitive
to the initial signal than are hedge funds. For example, a positive signal will induce a large
number of mutual funds to forgo acquiring information, compared to a relatively smaller
number of hedge funds who now learn. The added informed hedge funds are unable to
impound the same amount of information into the price that the large amount of mutual
funds would have. Thus, the model predicts that positive signals generate less informative
prices than negative signals.
To empirically test the model’s predictions, the EDGAR data has been refined to produce
two measures of information acquisition. The first, Requests, captures the total number of
requests for information from mutual funds about a given stock over a period of time. The
second variable, IPs, records the total number of unique IP addresses from mutual funds
making requests for information. The resultant panel provides a unique setting in which
mutual fund information acquisition is measured at the stock level. Furthermore, as a proxy
for the initial signal, this paper uses the event sentiment score provided by RavenPack. This
score, which measures the sentiment of news articles, is viewed as a proxy for the initial
signal since it is found to be related to both retail trading and the probability that prices
will move away from fundamental value.
Consistent with the model, empirical analyses find that when the sentiment of news has
been negative mutual funds acquire relatively more information than hedge funds. Specifi-
cally, if sentiment has been negative instead of positive, a stock can expect up to 16% more
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requests from mutual funds relative to hedge funds. Further, if sentiment has been negative,
a stock can expect as much as 14% more IPs from mutual funds than hedge funds making
requests.
To test implications for price informativeness, this paper exploits earnings announcements
and utilizes the price jump ratio, a measure of price informativeness developed in Weller
(2017). The price jump ratio proxies for price informativeness by measuring price movements
in the days leading up to and including earnings announcements. The intuition behind this
measure is that earnings announcements will result in small price movements when the price
is informative. Alternatively, when the announcement causes large price movements, prices
contained less information. Using this proxy, among others, the model’s prediction that
prices are more informative following news with negative sentiment is verified: prices are up
to 14% more informative when sentiment has been negative instead of positive.
Finally, tests also verify the prediction that hedge fund information acquisition is more
sensitive to that of mutual funds than vice versa. When mutual funds anticipate that a small
amount of hedge funds will become informed, between 9% and 19% more mutual fund IP
addresses will acquire information. By contrast, when hedge funds anticipate a low level of
information acquisition from mutual funds, 40% more hedge fund IP addresses will request
information.
This paper is related to the literature studying information acquisition when investors
face multiple dimensions of uncertainty. In particular, it is related to papers such as Romer
(1993), Gervais (1997), Avery and Zemsky (1998), Li (2013), Back, Crotty and Li (2013),
and Wang and Yang (2016), which consider scenarios where the precision of signals or the
proportion of informed traders is unknown. These papers focus on implications for market
microstructure, while this paper studies whether uncertainty about other informed investors
impacts incentives to acquire costly information. In, Gao, Song and Wang (2013), the pro-
portion of informed traders is unknown, but information acquisition is exogenous and there
are no short-sale constraints. Banerjee and Green (2015) studies asset prices when some in-
vestors are uncertain whether others are trading with information. Similar to Banerjee and
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Green (2015), my paper utilizes both rational expectations and differences of opinions ap-
proaches, but in contrast, my paper uses a common short-sale constraint to drive uncertainty
about whether informed investors are participating in the market.5 Further, while Banerjee
and Green (2015) focuses on risk-premia and volatility, my paper focuses on conditional
information acquisition in the face of short-sale prohibitions.
Much of the existing work using rational expectations models employs a setting with
normally-distributed variables that generate linear prices. However, using insights from
Breon-Drish (2015), the model in this paper can handle non-linear prices generated by the
short-sale prohibition. Using the “residual demand” approach instead of the typical “con-
jecture and verify” approach, investors are able to update from the price even though they
are uncertain regarding the participation of informed investors.
This paper also contributes to a large literature regarding short selling.6 Although loosely
related, the closest paper in this respect is Nezafat, Schroder and Wang (2017), which ex-
amines information acquisition in the presence of short-sale constraints. Similar to Nezafat,
Schroder and Wang (2017), this paper allows information acquisition to be endogenously
determined when investors are prohibited from short selling. In contrast, my paper allows
for two sets of investors (constrained and unconstrained) who endogenously respond to each
other. Also, my paper focuses on the interaction between short-sale prohibitions and recent
news releases.
To date, empirical studies of information acquisition faced the difficulty of measuring
investors’ information acquisition activity. This has been overcome in part by inferring infor-
mation acquisition from returns around earnings announcements (Morse (1981), Meulbroek
(1992), Heflin, Subramanyam and Zhang (2003), Weller (2017)). Other papers have used
5Related papers utilizing the rational expectations approach include Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Hellwig
(1980), and Verrecchia (1982), those using differences of opinion include Harrison and Kreps (1978), Banerjee
and Kremer (2010).
6Miller (1977), Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), Boehme, Danielsen and Sorescu (2006), Bris, Goetzmann and
Zhu (2007), Chang, Cheng and Yu (2007), Saffi and Sigurdsson (2010), Engleberg, Reed and Ringgenberg
(2012), Beber and Pagano (2013), Boehmer, Jones and Zhang (2013), and Kolanski, Reed and Thornock
(2013).
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Google or Yahoo searches to measure information acquisition (Da, Engleberg Gao (2011),
Drake, Roulstone and Thornock (2012), Lawrence, Ryans, Sun and Laptev (2018)). This
paper adds to this literature by using a rich measure of information acquisition derived from
EDGAR search records. By using a hand-unmasked sample of mutual fund and hedge fund
IP addresses, this paper is able to quantify information acquisition activity and clearly at-
tribute it to specific institutional investors. While other papers explore the EDGAR log files,
this is among the first to refine the data by focusing on a sample of identifiable institutional
investors.7
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Chapter 2 details the theoretical
model and its predictions. Chapter 3 describes the data and discusses the empirical results.
Chapter 4 provides a series of robustness checks. Chapter 5 contains concluding remarks.
7Other papers using the EDGAR log files data include, Drake, Roulstone and Thornock (2016), Dyer (2017),
Chen, Cohen, Gurun, Lou and Malloy (2018), Crane, Crotty and Umar (2018), and Gibbons, Iliev and
Kalodimos (2018).
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CHAPTER 2: A MODEL OF INFORMATION ACQUISITION
The model is an extension of the classic Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) setting. The
key modifications are (i) the imposition of a short-sale prohibition on a subset of poten-
tially informed investors, and (ii) the addition of an initial stage in which news generates
disagreement prior to the information acquisition decision.
Section 2.1. Assets, Investors, and Information
There is a single, risky asset with payoff θ, where θ ∼ N(0, τ−1θ ). The supply of the risky
asset is random and denoted by u, where u ∼ N(0, τ−1u ).1 There is also a risky-free asset
that has a gross return of one and is in perfectly elastic supply.
There are three types of investors: hedge funds, mutual funds, and retail. Hedge funds
(of measure ν) are institutional investors without a short-sale prohibition. Hedge funds can
learn θ perfectly by paying κθ. The portion of hedge funds who become informed is denoted
by µ. Mutual funds (of measure ω) are institutional investors who are prohibited from short
selling. Mutual funds can pay κα to observe a noisy signal: Sα = θ+α where α ∼ N(0, τ−1α ).
The portion of mutual funds who become informed is denoted by δ.
Retail investors (of measure one) have access to a free signal, which they believe provides
information about the payoff: they think Sη = θ + η where η ∼ N(0, τ−1η ). Institutional
investors also observe this initial signal, but know that it is just noise: Sη = η. Retail
investors do not update their beliefs upon observing the price as they believe the information
acquired by institutional investors is only noise.2
1Noisy supply is included in the model to prevent prices from being fully revealing. Modeling shares of the
risky asset to be in random supply is equivalent to a setting where shares are in zero net supply and noise
traders submit random demands.







choose whether to learn,








Figure 2.1: Model Timeline
The order of events is as follows: Upon observing the initial signal, retail investors believe
that E[θ|Sη] = τηSητθ+τη . Importantly, institutional investors decide whether to become informed
after observing Sη. From their perspective, Sη generates predictable price pressure from retail
investors. For example, a positive signal leads retail investors to believe the payoff of the
risky asset will be greater than zero, whereas the correct expectation of θ is still zero. In
expectation, retail investors will demand positive shares of the risky asset, thereby pushing
the price of the asset above its payoff.
Institutional investors who choose to become informed receive their additional signals and
update their beliefs regarding θ. Trading then occurs in a rational expectations equilibrium
where investors submit optimal demand schedules, X?, which condition on the information
in the price, P . All investors are risk-neutral and maximize their expected profits, Π, subject








Following trading, the payoff of the risky asset is observed and trading gains/losses are
realized. The timeline of events in this model is shown below.
3Results are expected to be similar in a setting with risk-averse investors, but given the non-linearity in
prices, characterizing the results would be more difficult. Vives (2011), Rostek and Weretka (2012), Duffie
and Zhu (2017), and Banerjee, Davis and Gondhi (2018).
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Section 2.2. Equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of the optimal proportion of mutual funds and hedge funds who
become informed, δ? and µ?, such that: (i) investor demands are optimal, (ii) the price
clears the market, (iii) hedge funds and mutual funds are indifferent between becoming
informed and remaining uninformed, and (iv) institutional investors rationally update from
the market clearing price.
Given the universal objective function, the optimal demand for every investor type can
























The optimal demand for investors who face a short-sale prohibition, X?M , includes the
maximization function to ensure they can only demand positive shares. The information
sets, I, of all investor types contain the price and the initial signal; in addition, informed
hedge funds know θ perfectly while informed mutual funds have observed Sα.
The market clearing condition requires that total demand from mutual funds, hedge
funds, and retail investors is equal to total supply:4
νµXHθ + ν(1− µ)XHP + ωδXMS + ω(1− δ)XMP +XR = u. (2.3)
In equilibrium, institutional investors must be indifferent between becoming informed
and remaining uninformed. Put differently, the marginal benefit of becoming informed must
4The subscripts to optimal demands refer to investor types and their information sets. Hθ represents hedge
funds who have observed θ while HP represents hedge funds who rely on the price. The subscripts for
mutual funds and retail investors follow.
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∣∣∣Sη]− E[(θ − P)XHP − γ
2
X2HP









∣∣∣Sη]− E[(θ − P)XMP − γ
2
X2MP
∣∣∣Sη] = κα. (2.4b)
Updating from the price is typically straightforward in this class of models. Following
the conjecture and verify approach, the price is expressed as a linear function of the payoff,
noise, and other factors. Then, the price can be transformed into a normally-distributed
signal of the payoff and standard Bayesian updating leads to a tractable expression for the
posterior belief regarding θ.
This conventional updating procedure does not apply in this setting for two reasons.
First, due to the maximization function in the optimal demand of mutual funds, the price
is non-linear. Second, uninformed investors are uncertain regarding the quality of the signal
they observe from the price. The quality of the price’s signal is determined by the trading
activity of informed investors: as more informed investors trade, the information content of
the price increases. In this model, the trading activity of informed, potentially-constrained
investors (i.e., informed mutual funds) is unknown to uninformed investors. As a result,
uninformed investors cannot update in the typical fashion.
Instead, uninformed mutual funds and hedge funds use the price to update as follows: At
the trading stage, uninformed investors have observed Sη and the price, thus they know their
own demand as well as the demand from retail investors. The uninformed remain uncertain,
however, regarding the demands from informed mutual funds and hedge funds as well as
noisy supply. With this in mind, uninformed investors construct an observable signal, S, by
rearranging the market clearing condition according to what they know and what they do
not know:
S = ν(1− µ)XHP + ω(1− δ)XMP +XR︸ ︷︷ ︸
Known/Observable




Using optimal demand functions XHθ and XMS, the expression for S can be updated:


















Equation (2.6) cannot be transformed into a standard, normally-distributed signal due
to the maximization function in the optimal demand of informed mutual funds. Instead,
the signal, S, comes from one of two regimes. The first arises when informed mutual funds




> P ) and demand positive shares. In the




< P ) and
demand zero shares as their short-sale prohibition binds. Although the signal extracted from
the price is observable by uninformed investors using equation (2.5), which regime produces
the signal is unclear: there is not a one-to-one mapping from price to regime. However, since
the uninformed hold coherent beliefs regarding the likelihood of either regime being realized,
they can update from the price using S. With this insight, the uninformed can form an





















Fu(ũ)fu(u1) + [1− Fu(ũ)]fu(u2)
]
dα. (2.8)
The joint density of the payoff and the price accounts for the probabilities of being in





> P . Given θ and α, this occurs with probability Fu(ũ). The second




< P , which occurs with probability [1 − Fu(ũ)]. The
cutoff point between the two regimes is denoted with ũ. The probability of observing S
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given the first regime is realized is fu(u1), while fu(u2) is the probability of observing S in
the second regime.5
Informed mutual funds know which regime will be realized. As such, they use the price








τθ + τα + τI
, (2.9)
where









Given the non-linearity of the price and the complexity of E[θ|P ], the equilibrium price
cannot be expressed analytically. Numerical simulation is required to solve for the price and
to produce comparative statics. The objective of the simulation is to solve for the equilibrium
proportions of mutual funds and hedge funds that become informed (δ?, µ?). An overview of
the simulation procedure is as follows: First, holding δ fixed and for a given Sη, a numerical
solver is used to find the market clearing price for 10, 000 random draws of the (θ, α, u) triplet.
For each of the 10, 000 draws, investors trade optimally (equation (2.2)), the price satisfies
the market clearing condition (equation (2.3)), and investors use the price to rationally
update (equations (2.7) and (2.9)). Next, the average profit differential between informed
and uninformed hedge funds is calculated using the 10, 000 random draws. A numerical
solver is used to find the optimal proportion of hedge funds who become informed, µ?, such
that this average profit differential is equal to the cost hedge funds pay to become informed
(equation (2.4a)).
This procedure is followed across a grid of δ values from zero to one. Then, for each δ, the
average profit differential between informed and uninformed mutual funds is calculated using
5A detailed derivation of E[θ|P ] is provided in Appendix A.
6The derivation of E[θ|Sα, P ] is provided in Appendix B.
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the 10, 000 random draws. The optimal proportion of mutual funds who become informed,
δ?, is identified as the δ such that the average profit differential is equal to the cost mutual
funds pay to become informed (equation (2.4b)). Taken together, this process uses model
parameters and a given Sη to find µ
? and δ?.7
The relationship between the initial signal, Sη, and average profit differentials between
informed and uninformed mutual funds is illustrated in Figure 2.2. This figure shows that
average profit differentials decrease with increasing Sη. Recall, Sη generates differing opinions
between institutional investors and retail. Increasing the initial signal increases the likelihood
that retail investors will have an optimistic view of the risky asset and will push its price
above its fundamental value. The probability that mutual funds will refrain from trading and
earn zero profits (whether informed of uninformed) thus increases with Sη. This is especially
costly for informed mutual funds who are unable to benefit from their acquisition of costly,
private information.
Figure 2.2 also shows that for a given Sη, average profit differentials strictly decrease
with increasing δ: as more mutual funds become informed, the price will be more informa-
tive, providing a relative benefit to uninformed mutual funds. Furthermore, average profit
differentials are relatively more sensitive to Sη than to δ. For example, Figure 2.2 shows
that, holding Sη fixed, the difference in average profit differentials between δ = 0 and δ = 1
is less than 0.02. By contrast, fixing δ, the difference in average profit differentials between
Sη = −2 and Sη = +2 is at least 0.06, which is three times as much as the previous case. It
follows that when deciding whether to acquire private information, mutual funds are more
sensitive to Sη than to δ. Thus, a common response of mutual funds to Sη will be to either
all become informed (δ? = 1) or to all remain uninformed (δ? = 0).
The relationship between the initial signal, Sη, and optimal hedge fund information
acquisition, µ?, is illustrated in Figure 2.3. This figure highlights the effect of constrained
mutual funds on the information acquisition of hedge funds. When mutual funds all remain
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Figure 2.2: Mutual Fund Differential Profits
This figure illustrates the relationship between mutual fund differential profits (ΠI −ΠU ) and the initial signal (Sη). The figure
also highlights differential profits when mutual funds optimally acquire information, δ?.
uninformed (δ = 0), hedge funds do not condition their information acquisition on the initial
signal. Under this scenario, the quality of the price’s signal is perfectly known since there are
zero informed mutual funds to be influenced by Sη. Hedge funds do condition their behavior
on Sη when some proportion of mutual funds become informed (δ > 0). When hedge funds
expect more trading from informed mutual funds, they will acquire less information. Thus,
hedge funds acquire less information given negative Sη and more when Sη is positive. This
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Figure 2.3: Hedge Fund Information Acquisition in Equilibrium
This figure illustrates the relationship between µ? and the initial signal, Sη . Mutual fund learning, δ, is taken as both exogenous
and endogenous.
Section 2.3. Model Predictions
The model produces a series of novel predictions. First, the model generates predictions
regarding the information acquisition of mutual funds and hedge funds. The model also pre-
dicts that the informativeness of prices is related to the initial signal and to the composition
of informed investors. Finally, extending the model provides a unique prediction regarding
information acquisition and institutional ownership.
Subsection 2.3.1. Information Acquisition and the Initial Signal
Figure 2.4 shows the optimal proportions of informed mutual funds and hedge funds with
respect to the initial signal. It is clear that mutual funds prefer to become informed following
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Figure 2.4: Relative Institutional Information Acquisition
This figure shows the optimal information acquisition of mutual funds (δ?) and hedge funds (µ?) in equilibrium. This figure
also shows their difference (δ? − µ?).
case where the initial signal is positive, resulting in retail investors holding a relatively
optimistic opinion of the payoff. From the perspective of mutual funds, retail investors are
likely to generate upward price pressure by demanding positive shares of the asset. Thus, in
expectation the asset will be overpriced and mutual funds will be constrained by their short-
sale prohibition. Since a positive initial signal leads mutual funds to anticipate being unable
to trade, their incentive to acquire costly information is diminished. Following positive Sη,
mutual funds endogenously choose to remain uninformed. The opposite occurs when the
initial signal is negative: mutual funds expect to trade profitably and are more willing to
pay the cost to acquire information.
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More hedge funds acquire information when they perceive fewer mutual funds will become
informed and when these mutual funds are less likely to trade on their information. Following
a negative signal, the pessimistic opinion of retail investors makes it more likely that mutual
funds will be able to trade. More mutual funds will acquire information in this scenario,
and in expectation more of their information will be impounded into the price. Hedge funds
respond by substituting out the costly acquisition of private information and relying more
on the freely observed and increasingly informative price.
Prediction 1. Relative to hedge funds, mutual funds acquire more (less) information when
the initial signal is negative (positive).
Subsection 2.3.2. Price Informativeness
At first glance, it is unclear whether the price should be more informative following
positive or negative initial signals. More hedge funds and fewer mutual funds are acquiring
information when the signal is positive, but when the signal is negative fewer hedge funds and
more mutual funds become informed. Closer examination of the model, however, provides
both the answer and intuition.
Recall that mutual funds are acutely sensitive to the initial signal and their short-sale
prohibition. As the signal moves from negative to positive, a relatively large portion of mu-
tual funds will refrain from acquiring information, and for those who do become informed,
they have a decreased likelihood of trading. A relatively large amount of information, there-
fore, is not acquired and not impounded into prices by mutual funds. On the other hand,
more hedge funds become informed in response to fewer expected informed mutual funds.
But whereas a large portion of mutual funds change their behavior, only a relatively small
amount of hedge funds change from being uninformed to acquiring information. This rel-
atively small group of informed hedge funds are unable to inject into the price the same
amount of information that the large bloc of mutual funds would have.
Prediction 2. Prices are more informative following negative signals than following positive
signals.
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One way to see Prediction 2 is by measuring price informativeness as the covariance of the
price and the payoff scaled by the variance of the price.8 In other words, the informativeness
of the price is the ratio of its signal and its noise. Using this terminology, Figure 2.5 illustrates
that both the signal and the noise increase with Sη. That is, when the initial signal is positive,
the price is both more variable and more closely associated with the payoff. Changes in the
price’s variance, however, are larger than changes in its covariance with the payoff. Figure
2.5 indicates that the variance of the price increases by approximately 45% as Sη changes
from negative to positive, while the price’s covariance with the payoff increases by only 25%.
It follows that the informativeness of the price decreases with the initial signal since the
price is becoming relatively more noisy.
Another way to view price informativeness is to consider the price’s accuracy by measur-
ing how close the equilibrium price is to the asset’s payoff. This can be done by measuring
the absolute difference between θ and the equilibrium price. While it is expected that this
measure is smallest when the initial signal is near zero, comparing this measure between
positive and negative signals should be instructive as to when prices are more informative.
Figure 2.6 shows that it is when the initial signal is positive that the absolute difference
between θ and the price is the largest, and thus the price is least accurate. This supports
the evidence from Figure 2.5: prices are more informative following negative signals than
positive.
Prediction 3. Prices are more informative when relatively more mutual funds than hedge
funds are acquiring information.
Prediction 3 follows from Figures 2.5 and 2.6 and from the discussion above. When the
signal is negative and relatively more mutual funds than hedge funds are informed, the price
is more informative in terms of both the signal-to-noise ratio and price accuracy.
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Figure 2.5: Price Informativeness: Signal-to-Noise
This figure shows the variance of the price, the covariance between the price and the payoff, and the price informativeness with
respect to Sη . Price informativeness is defined as the covariance between the price and the payoff divided by the variance of
the price.
Subsection 2.3.3. Information Acquisition and Other Investors
In addition to highlighting the relationship between information acquisition and the initial
signal, the model also describes how mutual funds and hedge funds respond to each other.
Consider the model analyzed without hedge funds. In this scenario, the initial signal still
generates buying or selling pressure from retail investors and mutual funds remain prohibited
from short selling. Since the initial signal changes the likelihood that mutual funds will be
able to trade, they still consider the signal when deciding whether to acquire information.
Further, Figure 2.4 shows that when hedge funds are present in the model, their level of
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Figure 2.6: Price Informativeness: Accuracy
This figure shows the absolute difference between the payoff of the risky asset and its price as a function of Sη .
When deciding whether to acquire information, the chief concern of mutual funds is whether
the initial signal will trigger their short-sale prohibition.
Now consider the model without mutual funds. This scenario is depicted by the horizontal
line in Figure 2.3, which shows that without informed mutual funds, hedge funds acquire
information independent of the initial signal. Hedge funds only condition their information
acquisition on the signal to the extent that it influences the behavior of mutual funds.
When deciding whether to become informed, hedge funds are primarily concerned with the
information acquired by mutual funds, thus they are only indirectly affected by the signal,
Sη.
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Prediction 4. In terms of information acquisition, hedge funds are sensitive to the behavior
of mutual funds: more hedge funds acquire information when they expect fewer informed
mutual funds. In comparison, mutual funds are less sensitive to the information acquisition
behavior of hedge funds.
Subsection 2.3.4. Information Acquisition and Institutional Ownership
The model can be readily extended to account for mutual funds who are not prohibited
from short selling because they either own the asset or do not subject themselves to such
a prohibition. If it is assumed that these unconstrained mutual funds can acquire private
information, the model extension speaks to the responses of hedge funds and constrained
mutual funds to institutional ownership.
Similar to an earlier argument, hedge funds primarily care about the activity of other
informed investors, while constrained mutual funds are mainly concerned with the initial
signal and their short-sale prohibition. As the mass of unconstrained mutual funds increases,
constrained mutual funds do not alter their information acquisition. On the other hand, fewer
hedge funds acquire information due to the substitutability of information. In other words,
hedge funds substitute out costly private information and instead rely on a more informative
and costless signal from the price.
Prediction 5. Fewer hedge funds acquire information as institutional ownership increases.
In comparison, information acquisition by constrained mutual funds is less sensitive to in-
stitutional ownership.
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CHAPTER 3: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Testing the model’s predictions requires data measuring the information acquisition ac-
tivity of institutional investors. Given the model explicitly differentiates between types of
institutions (mutual funds and hedge funds), the data should also distinguish between these
institutional investor types. This paper uses a dataset that captures the information acqui-
sition of investors and classifies them as mutual funds or hedge funds. The predictions from
the model are empirically tested using this unique dataset.
Section 3.1. Data Sources and Sample Construction
The primary dataset used to test the predictions from the model has been derived from
the EDGAR log files, which record requests to view documents on the EDGAR filing system,
the SEC’s online repository for public information. An observation in the EDGAR log files
contains details from an electronic request to view, for example, a 10-K filing for IBM. This
request is recorded along with the date, the time, the CIK of the filer, the specific filing
requested, the size of the electronic file requested, and a masked version of the IP address
from whence the request originated. Requesting IP addresses are masked as the last of their
four octets is reported as a random set of three letters in place of the actual digits.1 For
example, the SEC reports the IP address 152.19.255.34 as 152.19.255.xxx, where xxx is a
combination of three letters. Using the first three octets of an IP address combined with
historical IP registration records, many IP addresses requesting information from EDGAR
have been linked to specific financial institutions.2 The result is a hand-unmasked sample
of mutual fund and hedge fund IP addresses and their history of requesting (acquiring)
1In terms of IP addresses, an octet is a group of eight bits, or the one to three digit numbers separated by
periods in the example above.
2IP registration records were acquired from MaxMind, https://www.maxmind.com/en/home.
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information from EDGAR. Over 400 mutual fund and hedge fund companies have been
unmasked, and 17.9 million of their requests for information between January 2012 and
June 2017 have been included in the sample.
Mutual fund and hedge fund information acquisition are defined at the stock level and
aggregated both monthly and in the weeks leading up to earnings announcements. Two vari-
ables measuring information acquisition are derived from the EDGAR data: (i) Requestsmit
counts the total number of requests for information by mutual funds regarding stock i during
time period t, and (ii) IPsmit records the total number of unique IP addresses from mutual
funds requesting information (superscript h in place of m would indicate hedge funds in-
stead of mutual funds). These two variables are referred to as the Learning variables in
what follows, and serve as proxies for δ and µ from the model.
This study also uses data from RavenPack, which provides a history of news releases
linked to specific firms. In addition, RavenPack conducts sentiment analysis of news items
and produces an event sentiment score, which ranges from zero to 100, with 50 indicating
neutral sentiment.3 These stock-level sentiment scores are aggregated both monthly and in
the weeks leading up to earnings announcements. The main variable derived from RavenPack
is ESSit, which is calculated as the median event sentiment score across all news stories
regarding stock i over period t. This measure is used as a proxy for the model’s initial
signal, Sη.
4
This paper also utilizes the CRSP, Compustat, TAQ, MIDAS, and Thomson Reuters
databases.5
Section 3.2. Information Acquisition and the Sentiment of Recent News
Prediction 1 states that, relative to hedge funds, mutual funds will acquire more infor-
mation when the sentiment of recent news is negative compared to when it is positive. This
3Previous work to utilize the RavenPack event sentiment scores include Green, Hand and Penn (2012), Ho,
Shi and Zhang (2013), and Dang, Moshirian and Zhang (2015).
4The mapping from the model’s Sη to ESS from RavenPack is discussed in more detail in Section 4.1.
5Further details regarding the sources of data are provided in Appendix D.
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prediction is tested using the following regression model:
Diffit = β1Negativeit + β2Positiveit + β3Xit + ζi + φt + εit, (3.1)
where Diff is equal to the difference between mutual fund and hedge fund information
acquisition. For instance, when using Requests to measure information acquisition, Diff is
equal to total requests from mutual funds less total requests from hedge funds (Requestsmit −
Requestshit). The independent variable Negative is an indicator equal to one when ESS ≤
47. The variable Positive takes the value of one when ESS ≥ 53 (recall that neutral
sentiment is 50). The matrix X contains the natural logarithm of the following control
variables: the number of news releases (Articles), total trading volume (V olume), average
market capitalization over the time period, the number of owning institutional investors
(No. Inst.), and total institutional ownership of shares (Inst. Own.). The X matrix also
contains the average daily price volatility over the period (V olatility) and indicator variables
for whether period t contains or corresponds to stock i’s quarterly or annual filings. Stock
and year-month fixed effects (ζi and φt) are included to control for unobserved heterogeneity
at the stock-level and in the time dimension.
Two different settings are considered. In the first, t refers to monthly time periods: ESS,
Diff and all other variables are measured monthly. The second setting focuses on the weeks
leading up to earnings announcements. In this setting, all variables are measured in the four
week period prior to stock i’s earnings announcement. This second setting is considered for
two reasons. First, the EDGAR data show that mutual funds and hedge funds acquire more
information in the weeks leading up to earnings announcements. Second, the model makes
predictions regarding price informativeness. These predictions will be tested by examining
prices and information acquisition leading up to earnings announcements.
Testing Prediction 1 is done by analyzing the difference between β1 and β2. Finding β1 >
β2 would provide support for the prediction that relative to hedge funds, more mutual funds
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acquire information when the sentiment of news has been negative. Results are reported in
Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 shows that relative to hedge funds, mutual funds acquire more information
when the sentiment of news is negative. As an example, column (4) shows that when news
sentiment is negative instead of positive in the weeks leading up to an earnings announce-
ment, mutual funds will make 7 more requests relative to requests by hedge funds. Given that
on average mutual funds make 45 more requests than hedge funds, mutual funds increase
their information acquisition by 16% relative to hedge funds when sentiment is negative.
Similarly, column (2) shows that mutual funds make 3.75 more requests, relative to requests
by hedge funds, when sentiment has been negative for a given month. The average monthly
difference between mutual fund and hedge fund requests is 22; thus an increase of 3.75 re-
quests indicates that mutual funds increase their information acquisition by 17% relative to
hedge funds when sentiment is negative for the month.
When focusing on IPs, column (8) of Table 3.1 shows that almost 2 additional mutual
fund IP addresses, relative to hedge fund IPs, acquire information when the sentiment of
news is negative. This suggests that when measured by IP addresses, mutual funds increase
their information acquisition by 14% relative to hedge funds when sentiment is negative.
Overall, Table 3.1 provides support for Prediction 1: relative to hedge funds, more mutual
funds acquire information when the sentiment of news is negative instead of positive.
Section 3.3. Price Informativeness
The model makes two predictions regarding the informativeness of prices. Prediction 2
states that prices should be more informative when the sentiment of news is negative instead
of positive. Prediction 3 states that prices should be more informative when relatively more
mutual funds are acquiring information compared to hedge funds. Both of these predictions
can be tested using the data previously detailed with the addition of price informativeness
measures.
One proxy for the information content of prices is the price jump ratio (PJR), a measure
developed in Weller (2017). The price jump ratio compares price movements in the weeks
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Table 3.1: Information Acquisition and the Sentiment of Recent News
This table presents results from testing the relationship between information acquisition and the sentiment of recent news.
The tests use the regression model in equation (3.1). The dependent variable, Diff is measured with either Requests or IPs
and both the monthly setting and the earnings announcement (EA Dates) setting are utilized. The variable ESSit captures
the sentiment of recent news regarding stock i during period t. ESS is measured using the median sentiment rating from
RavenPack. The indicator variable Negative takes on the value of one if ESS ≤ 47. The indicator variable Positive takes on
the value of one if ESS ≥ 53. The table presents Neg−Pos as a test of whether negative and positive news induce differential
information acquisition. The matrix Xit contains the natural logarithm of the following control variables: the number of
news releases (Articles), total trading volume (V olume), average market capitalization over the time period (not shown), the
number of owning institutional investors (No. Inst.), and total institutional ownership of shares (Inst. Own.). The X matrix
also contains the average daily price volatility over the period (V olatility) and indicator variables for whether period t contains
or corresponds to stock i’s quarterly or annual filings. Stock and year-month fixed effects are included. Standard errors are
clustered by stock and year-month. The sample is made up of approximately 3,300 stocks and 66 months.
Requests IPs
Monthly EA Dates Monthly EA Dates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Negative 2.25*** 1.42* 4.85*** 4.39*** 1.03*** 0.77*** 1.28*** 1.18***
(s.e.) (0.65) (0.71) (1.27) (1.44) (0.15) (0.16) (0.20) (0.23)
Positive -2.49*** -2.32*** -4.62*** -2.67** -0.71*** -0.52*** -0.87*** -0.70***
(0.54) (0.59) (1.03) (1.11) (0.07) (0.09) (.141) (0.17)
Articles 4.28*** 6.17*** 1.27*** 1.66***
(0.38) (0.60) (0.09) (0.10)
V olume 4.46*** 5.00*** 1.25*** 1.29***
(0.45) (0.50) (0.11) (0.09)
No. Inst. 0.91 1.15 0.04 -0.030
(0.98) (1.15) (0.19) (0.19)
Inst. Own. -0.23 -0.50 -0.15 -0.04
(0.55) (0.56) (0.10) (0.09)
V olatility -0.92*** -0.68** -0.19*** -0.07
(0.23) (0.27) (0.05) (0.05)
Neg − Pos 4.74*** 3.75*** 9.47*** 7.05*** 1.74*** 1.29*** 2.15*** 1.88***
(s.e.) (0.96) (1.11) (2.03) (2.26) (0.18) (0.19) (.305) (0.36)
R2 .560 .568 .595 .601 .778 .799 .811 .820
Observations 141,146 141,146 48,782 48,782 141,146 141,146 48,782 48,782
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it is the cumulative abnormal return from the day before stocks i’s earn-
ings announcement to the day after, while the denominator contains the cumulative abnormal
return beginning one month before an earnings announcement.6
The intuition behind this measure can be developed with an example. Consider that at
its earnings announcement a stock’s price experiences a significant jump, especially compared
to how much the price moved over the last month. It can be said that the price just prior to
the earnings announcement was weakly informative as to the content of the announcement.
On the other hand, consider that at the earnings announcement, the stock’s price moved
very little, particularly when compared to how much the price moved over the last month.
This is an example of a price accurately corresponding to the content of the announcement.
Following this intuition, high price jump ratios indicate low levels of price informativeness
while low price jump ratios are indicative of high price informativeness.
Following the same logic, the numerator from the price jump ratio can be used as a second
proxy for price informativeness. This second measure is referred to as the price jump (PJ).














6Abnormal returns are calculated using the three-factor model (Fama and French (1993)).
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This model is similar to the regressions used previously. The independent variable, L,
measures learning from either mutual funds or hedge funds, and also measures their differ-
ence, Diff . Testing whether prices are more informative when news sentiment is negative is
done by comparing β2 to β3. Finding β2 < β3 would provide support for Prediction 2. The
prediction that prices are more informative when relatively more mutual funds are learning
is tested by analyzing β1 in the specification where L = Diff . If β1 < 0 in this specification,
then Prediction 3 would be supported.
Using Learning instead of Diff as an independent variable provides a validity check for
the data. For instance, finding β1 ≮ 0 would imply that as institutional investors acquire
more information, the price of a stock fails to become more informative. However, it should
be the case that more information acquisition will lead to more informative prices. If in-
stitutional information acquisition as measured from the EDGAR data is a good proxy, it
should provide estimates for β1 that are less than zero.
Finally, L is lagged one time period. This is done to address reverse causality. If β1 < 0
using Learningit, it could be the case that investors are acquiring more information when
they believe the price is more informative. This reverse causality story is ruled out by using
lagged Learning.
Results using equation (3.3) are displayed in Table 3.2. In this table, odd-numbered
columns measure price informativeness with PJR and even-numbered columns use PJ ,
while Learning is measured using IPs. Notice that β1 is significantly less than zero in the
first four columns. This indicates that prices are more informative when more information
is acquired by mutual funds and hedge funds. Specifically, the estimate in column (1) of
−0.017 indicates that the price jump ratio will fall by 50 basis points when 30% more mutual
fund IP addresses request information. In terms of the price jump, the estimate of −0.056
in column (4) suggests that it will decrease by 1% when 18% more hedge funds acquire
information.
Prediction 2 is supported as negative sentiment leads to price jump ratios being reduced
by 4 percentage points. Given that the average price jump ratio in the sample is 50 percentage
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Table 3.2: Price Informativeness
This table presents results from testing whether information acquisition and the sentiment of recent news are related to price
informativeness. The tests use the regression model in equation (3.3). Odd-numbered columns use PJR as the dependent
variable while even-numbered columns use PJ . Learning is measured using IPs and is lagged one period in all specifications.
ESS is measured using the median sentiment rating from RavenPack. The indicator variable Negative takes on the value of
one if ESS ≤ 47. The indicator variable Positive takes on the value of one if ESS ≥ 53. The table presents Neg − Pos as
a test of whether negative and positive news induce differential price informativeness. The matrix Xit contains the natural
logarithm of the following control variables: the number of news releases (Articles), total trading volume (V olume), average
market capitalization over the time period (not shown), the number of owning institutional investors (No. Inst.), and total
institutional ownership of shares (Inst. Own.). The X matrix also contains the average daily price volatility over the period
(V olatility) and indicator variables for whether period t contains or corresponds to stock i’s quarterly or annual filings. Stock
and year-month fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by stock and year-month. The sample is made up of
approximately 3,300 stocks and 66 months.
Price Jumps
Mutual Funds Hedge Funds Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Learning -.017*** -.063*** -.012** -.056*** -.0013** -.007***
(s.e.) (.005) (.013) (.006) (.012) (.0006) (.001)
Negative -.022* -.079*** -.022* -.078*** -.023* -.080***
(.011) (.026) (.011) (.026) (.011) (.026)
Positive .018 .065*** .018 .064*** .018 .064***
(.011) (.019) (.011) (.019) (.011) (.019)
Articles -.018*** -.046*** -.019*** -.047*** -.019*** -.047***
(.004) (.009) (.004) (.009) (.004) (.009)
V olume -.052*** .036** -.052*** .034** -.053*** .033**
(.006) (.014) (.006) (.013) (.006) (.013)
No. Inst. -.017 .073** -.017 .071** -.017 .074**
(.017) (.033) (.017) (.033) (.017) (.033)
Inst. Own. .018* -.018 .018* -.017 .018* -.018
(.010) (.017) (.010) (.017) (.010) (.017)
V olatility .000 .098*** .000 .098*** .000 .098***
(.003) (.007) (.003) (.007) (.003) (.007)
Neg − Pos -.040** -.144*** -.040** -.143*** -.041** -.144***
(s.e.) (.018) (.036) (.018) (.037) (.018) (.036)
R2 .304 .233 .304 .232 .304 .233
Observations 10,613 39,643 10,613 39,643 10,613 39,643
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points, price jump ratios are 8% lower when news sentiment is negative compared to when
it is positive. In other words, negative sentiment improves price informativeness by 8%, as
measured by the price jump ratio. When measuring price informativeness with price jumps,
Table 3.2 shows that prices are 14% more informative following news with negative sentiment
instead of positive.
Columns (5) and (6) provide support for Prediction 3. These columns show that as mutual
funds acquire more information relative to hedge funds, prices become more informative.
Highlighting column (5), the price jump ratio drops by 1.3 percentage points when 10 more
mutual fund IP addresses request information. This suggests that prices are 2.6% more
informative when, compared to hedge funds, 10 more mutual fund IP addresses acquire
information.
Section 3.4. Information Acquisition and Other Investors
Prediction 4 states that hedge funds acquire less information when they expect more
mutual funds will be learning. In comparison, mutual funds are less sensitive to hedge funds’
level of information acquisition. This prediction can be tested using similar techniques to
the previous section, but requires two steps. In the first step, news sentiment and other
information from period t − 1 are used to predict the level of information acquisition in
period t from hedge funds or mutual funds. For the sake of exposition, suppose that the first
step predicts information acquisition by hedge funds using the following regression equation:
ln(Learninghit) = β1Negativeit−1 + β2Positiveit−1 + β3Xit−1 + ζi + φt + εit, (3.5)
which is similar to equation (3.1) except the right-hand-side variables are calculated from
period t − 1 and the dependent variable measures hedge fund learning instead of Diff . In
the second step, the following regression is utilized to test the response of mutual funds to
the expected level of information acquisition from hedge funds:




it + β3Yit + ζi + φt + εit. (3.6)
31
In this setup, the level of hedge fund information acquisition predicted from the first step
is used to create variables indicating whether hedge funds are expected to acquire a high or
low amount of information. The indicator variable Lowh is equal to one when hedge fund
information acquisition is predicted to be in the lower quartile for a given stock. Similarly,
Highh is equal to one when hedge fund learning is predicted to be in the upper quartile.7
The control variables contained in Y include Negative, Positive, and X, similar to previous
specifications. Again, the regressions include stock and year-month fixed effects.
Equations (3.5) and (3.6) detail how to test whether mutual funds are sensitive to hedge
funds. These same equations can be used to test whether hedge funds are sensitive to mutual
funds by making the obvious changes. Testing these sensitivities is done by analyzing the
difference between β1 and β2 from the second-step regression. Finding β1 > β2 when Low
m
and Highm represent predicted mutual fund learning would indicate that hedge funds acquire
more information when they expect mutual funds are acquiring less.
Table 3.3 reports results using monthly time periods (odd-numbered columns) and the
weeks prior to earnings announcements (even-numbered). Three points can be made about
these results. First, in terms of acquiring information, hedge funds are highly sensitive to
the expected level of mutual fund learning. In Panel A, hedge funds increase their level of
information acquisition by as much as 42% when they anticipate a low level of mutual fund
information acquisition. Second, mutual funds are sensitive to the expected level of hedge
fund learning. Mutual funds increase their own level of information acquisition by between
9% and 19% when they anticipate low information acquisition by hedge funds.
Third, hedge funds are more sensitive to mutual funds than vice versa. This can be seen
by comparing the estimates of β1−β2 between hedge funds and mutual funds from Panel A.
Notice that hedge fund estimates are between 38% and 42%, while mutual fund estimates
7In addition to defining Low and High using quartiles, extreme deciles and terciles are also used.
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Table 3.3: Information Acquisition and Other Investors
This table presents results from testing whether hedge funds and mutual funds condition their information acquisition on
expected learning from each other. The tests utilize the regression model in equation (3.5) to calculate the expected level of
learning from the other investor type. Then the regression model in equation (3.6) is used to test whether investors learn
more when it is expected that the other investors will learn less. Odd-numbered columns define t in monthly terms. Even-
numbered columns define t as the time period 15 days prior to an earnings announcement date while t−1 corresponds to 15 day
period just prior to t. The dependent variables Learningh and Learningm are measured using either Requests or IPs. The
independent variable ESS captures the sentiment of recent news. ESS is measured using the median sentiment rating from
RavenPack. The indicator variable Negative takes on the value of one if ESS ≤ 47. The indicator variable Positive takes on
the value of one if ESS ≥ 53. The matrix Xit contains the natural logarithm of the following control variables: the number of
news releases (Articles), total trading volume (V olume), average market capitalization over the time period (not shown), the
number of owning institutional investors (No. Inst.), and total institutional ownership of shares (Inst. Own.). The X matrix
also contains the average daily price volatility over the period (V olatility) and indicator variables for whether period t contains
or corresponds to stock i’s quarterly or annual filings. Low is equal to one when learning from the other investor type for a
given stock is predicted to be in the lower quartile (Panel A), decile (Panel B), or tercile (Panel C). High is equal to one when
learning from the other investor type for a given stock is predicted to be in the upper quartile, decile, or tercile. The table
presents Low − High as a test of whether low expected learning from others results in different information acquisition than
when learning from others is expected to be high. The control variables contained in Y include Negative, Positive, and X.
Stock and year-month fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by stock and year-month and the Murphy-Topel
correction has been applied for predicted regressors. The sample is made up of approximately 3,300 stocks and 66 months.
Panel A. Quartile Cutoff
Mutual Funds Hedge Funds
Requests IPs Requests IPs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Low .054** .131*** .063*** .121*** .329*** .279*** .288*** .234***
(s.e.) (.024) (.034) (.017) (.024) (.106) (.094) (.065) (.055)
High -.033 -.038 -.028 -.070*** -.092** -.119** -.114*** -.148***
(.025) (.031) (.017) (.022) (.037) (.049) (.027) (.029)
Low −High .087** .168*** .091*** .192*** .422*** .398*** .402*** .382***
(s.e.) (.037) (.048) (.024) (.034) (.120) (.116) (.070) (.071)
R2 .745 .688 .819 .776 .611 .592 .688 .663
Observations 126,574 38,983 126,574 38,983 126,574 38,983 126,574 38,983
Panel B. Decile Cutoff
Low .068* .165*** .093*** .157*** .600*** .421*** .457*** .337***
(s.e.) (.039) (.048) (.025) (.034) (.166) (.152) (.090) (.080)
High -.048* -.075** -.033* -.098*** -.133*** -.254*** -.148*** -.178***
(.029) (.036) (.019) (.032) (.049) (.072) (.042) (.040)
Low −High .116** .239*** .126*** .255*** .733*** .675*** .605*** .514***
(s.e.) (.050) (.063) (.030) (.046) (.180) (.177) (.102) (.097)
R2 .745 .688 .819 .776 .612 .592 .689 .663
Observations 126,574 38,983 126,574 38,983 126,574 38,983 126,574 38,983
Panel C. Tercile Cutoff
Low .044* .132*** .050*** .130*** .283*** .264*** .249*** .214***
(s.e.) (.022) (.032) (.015) (.021) (.088) (.081) (.055) (.047)
High -.042* -.029 -.038** -.051** -.086** -.091** -.095*** -.120***
(.022) (.034) (.016) (.023) (.033) (.043) (.023) (.027)
Low −High .086** .162*** .089*** .181*** .369*** .355*** .343*** .333***
(s.e.) (.034) (.046) (.022) (.031) (.101) (.101) (.063) (.060)
R2 .745 .688 .819 .776 .610 .592 .688 .663
Observations 126,574 38,983 126,574 38,983 126,574 38,983 126,574 38,983
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are between 9% and 19%. Furthermore, when comparing the 95% confidence intervals of
these estimates, the intervals are disjoint for three out of the four settings considered.8
Overall, Table 3.3 provides supporting evidence for Prediction 4: when it comes to infor-
mation acquisition, hedge funds are more sensitive to mutual funds than vice versa.
Section 3.5. Information Acquisition and Institutional Ownership
The final prediction from the model speaks to the influence of institutional ownership on
information acquisition. Prediction 5 states that when it comes to information acquisition,
hedge funds are more sensitive to institutional ownership than are mutual funds. Hedge
funds will acquire less information when institutional ownership is higher. Mutual fund
information acquisition, on the other hand, is less sensitive to institutional ownership.
Institutional ownership has been included in each of the previous tests using both the
number of owning institutions and the number of shares owned by institutions. Table 3.3
included these two variables in the regression models explaining mutual fund and hedge fund
information acquisition. For mutual funds, Table 3.3 provides evidence that they acquire
more information as the number of owning institutions increases. However, the number of
shares owned by institutions is insignificant for mutual funds. With respect to hedge funds,
Table 3.3 shows that the number of owning institutions has no relationship with information
acquisition, but the number of shares owned by institutions does. The results suggest that
increasing institutional ownership decreases hedge fund information acquisition.
Causal interpretations should not be drawn from Table 3.3 as institutional ownership
and information acquisition are measured contemporaneously. It could be the case that
information acquisition leads to changes in institutional ownership, not the other way around.
To account for reverse causality, Table 3.4 displays results using equation (3.1) in the monthly
setting with lagged institutional ownership and Learning for mutual funds or hedge funds
as the dependent variable.
8The comparison must be done within similar settings. For example, column (1) compares to column (5)
while column (2) compares to column (6).
34
Table 3.4: Information Acquisition and Institutional Ownership
This table presents results from testing the relationship between information acquisition and institutional ownership. The tests
use the regression model similar to equation (3.1). All columns utilize the monthly setting. The dependent variable Learning
is measured with either Requests or IPs. The variable ESSit captures the sentiment of recent news regarding stock i during
period t. ESS is measured using the median sentiment rating from RavenPack. The indicator variable Negative takes on the
value of one if ESS ≤ 47. The indicator variable Positive takes on the value of one if ESS ≥ 53. The matrix Xit contains the
natural logarithm of the following control variables: the number of news releases (Articles), total trading volume (V olume),
average market capitalization over the time period (not shown), the number of owning institutional investors (No. Inst.), and
total institutional ownership of shares (Inst. Own.). Importantly, No. Inst. and Inst. Own. are lagged one month. The X
matrix also contains the average daily price volatility over the period (V olatility) and indicator variables for whether period
t contains or corresponds to stock i’s quarterly or annual filings. Stock and year-month fixed effects are included. Standard
errors are clustered by stock and year-month. The sample is made up of approximately 3,300 stocks and 66 months.
Panel A. Mutual Funds
Requests IPs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No. Inst. .024 .056*** .010 .034***
(s.e.) (.015) (.017) (.010) (.012)
Inst. Own. -.006 -.030** -.008 -.022***
(.010) (.011) (.007) (.008)
R2 .745 .745 .745 .818 .818 .818
Observations 126,619 126,619 126,619 126,619 126,619 126,619
Panel B. Hedge Funds
Requests IPs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No. Inst. -.045** .009 -.031*** .010
(s.e.) (.021) (.025) (.011) (.013)
Inst. Own. -.046*** -.050*** -.033*** -.037***
(.011) (.014) (.006) (.008)
R2 .609 .609 .609 .684 .684 .684
Observations 126,619 126,619 126,619 126,619 126,619 126,619
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With respect to mutual funds, Table 3.4 provides inconsistent evidence for the influence
of institutional ownership on their information acquisition. When using both institutional
ownership variables in the regression, it appears that institutional ownership matters, but
the two variables disagree as to the direction. As the number of institutional owners in-
creases mutual funds acquire more information. However, as the number of shares owned
by institutions increases, mutual funds acquire less information. Overall, there is no clear
relationship between mutual fund information acquisition and institutional ownership.
When focusing on hedge funds, Table 3.4 provides support for Prediction 5. That is,
as institutional ownership increases, hedge funds acquire less information. In particular, as
institutional ownership increases by 20%, hedge funds acquire between 0.7% and 1.0% less
information. In summary, Prediction 5 is supported as hedge fund information acquisition is
clearly related to institutional ownership, but mutual fund information acquisition is not.
36
CHAPTER 4: ROBUSTNESS TESTS
Table 3.1 through Table 3.4 provide the main empirical findings of this paper. In this
section, these findings are subject to several checks for robustness. These checks include
using subsamples and alternative measurements of key variables. This section also provides
detail regarding the mapping from the model’s Sη to ESS derived from the RavenPack data.
Section 4.1. Mapping Between Sη and ESS
Recall that ESS is measured using event sentiment scores from news stories collected by
RavenPack. The measurement of ESS uses stories from a variety of sources, including the
Dow Jones Newswires, Wall Street Journal, NBC, Reuters, New York Times, and Yahoo!
News, among others. Also, news stories containing tabular (i.e., quantitative) information
as well as commentary are included in this measurement. Thus, by construction ESS is not
solely a measure of fundamental information type, but also includes sentiment or tone. For
this reason, ESS is used as a proxy for Sη.
Further, for ESS to be a reasonable proxy for the initial signal, it should be related to
trading pressure from retail investors. To test whether this is the case, the buy-sell ratio using
signed odd-lot trades is used as a proxy for retail trading pressure.1 A two-step approach
is used in order to account for algorithmic trading since odd-lots are not solely from retail
investors, as demonstrated in O’Hara, Yao, and Ye (2014). In the first step, odd-lot buys and
sells are explained using the cancel-to-trade ratio (CTR), which is a proxy for algorithmic
trading. In this specification, oddTradesit is either the total amount of odd-lot buys or sells
1The idea that small trades, or odd-lot trades, are more likely to come from retail traders has been promoted
in papers such as, Lamont and Frazzini (2007), Hvidkjaer (2008), and Barber, Odean and Zhu (2009).
Trading data is taken from TAQ. The results presented use the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to sign
trades. Results are robust to using the algorithms developed by Ellis, Michaely and O’Hara (2000) and
Chakrabarty, Li, Nguyen and Van Ness (2007).
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for stock i during time period t. Stock and year-month fixed effects are included:
ln(oddTradesit) = β1ln(CTRit) + ζi + φt + εit. (4.1)
The buy-sell ratio from odd-lot trades (OddBSR) is then calculated using the residuals
from the first-step regressions. These residuals are interpreted as odd-lot trades that are
orthogonal to algorithmic trading, thus they are more likely to represent retail trading. Next,
the influence of ESS on this retail buy-sell ratio is tested using the following regression:
LowBSRit = β1Negativeit + β2Positiveit + β3RoundBSRit + β4Xit + ζi + φt + εit, (4.2)
where the dependent variable, LowBSR, takes the value of one when OddBSR is below
either 0.50 or 0.25. Thus, LowBSRit indicates whether stock i has experienced relative
selling pressure from retail investors in time period t. The control variable RoundBSR is
the buy-sell ratio from round lots. Using residual odd-lot trades from the first stage controls
for algorithmic trading, and using RoundBSR in the second stage controls for general trading
direction. The X matrix contains control variables such as the absolute difference between
OddBSR and 0.50 (RatioSize) and the natural logarithm of the number of news releases
(Articles). Stock and year-month fixed effects are included.
If ESS is a reasonable proxy for the initial signal, it should be the case that news with
negative sentiment leads to more selling pressure from retail investors and news with positive
sentiment leads to more buying pressure. Thus, following equation (4.2), β1 should be greater
than β2. This would indicate that negative sentiment increases the probability that there
will be significant selling pressure from retail investors. Results using equation (4.2) are
reported in Panel A of Table 4.1.
Panel A shows that news with negative sentiment increases the probability of selling
pressure from retail investors while news with positive sentiment decreases that probability.
Specifically, examining β1 − β2 shows that when the sentiment of news has been negative,
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Table 4.1: ESS as a Proxy for the Initial Signal
This table presents results from testing the relationships between the sentiment of recent news, retail trading (Panel A), and
price movements around earnings announcements (Panel B). The OddBSR variable is created using residual buys and sells
from regressions using equation (4.1). The results below use the regression model in equation (4.2). The dependent variable
LowBSR is an indicator of whether OddBSR is below 0.50 or 0.25. The variable RatioSize measures the absolute difference
between OddBSR and 0.50. RoundBSR measures the buy-sell ratio from round-lot trading. Under (Over) is equal to one
when stock i’s stock price jumps up (down) by at least 25% at its earning announcement. JumpSize is the absolute value
of a stock’s price jump. The matrix Xit contains the natural logarithm of the the number of news releases (Articles). Stock
and year-month fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by stock and year-month . The sample is made up of
approximately 3,300 stocks and 42 months.
Panel A. ESS and Retail Trades
Monthly Earnings Announcements
OddBSR < 0.50 OddBSR < 0.25 OddBSR < 0.50 OddBSR < 0.25
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Negative .013* .014* .011 .012 .064*** .039** .053*** .030*
(s.e.) (.007) (.007) (.008) (.007) (.021) (.017) (.017) (.016)
Positive -.013** -.011* -.010 -.009 -.030** -.013 -.027** -.012
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.012) (.010) (.012) (.011)
RoundBSR -5.87*** -5.82*** -6.00*** -5.40***
(0.16) (0.15) (0.23) (0.16)
RatioSize -.580*** -.675*** 2.23*** 2.139*** -1.09*** -1.24*** 4.94*** 4.81***
(.063) (.090) (0.12) (0.14) (0.02) (0.10) (.210) (0.21)
Articles -.033*** -.021*** -.031*** -.020*** -.049*** -.037*** -.038*** -.027***
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.007) (.005) (.007) (.005)
Neg − Pos .026*** .025*** .022** .021** .094*** .052** .080*** .042*
(s.e.) (.010) (.010) (.011) (.010) (.029) (.024) (.027) (.025)
R2 .043 .218 .054 .229 .057 .234 .117 .284
Observations 99,803 99,803 99,803 99,803 35,058 35,058 35,058 35,058
Panel B. ESS and Earnings Announcements
Under Over
Raw Abnormal Raw Abnormal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Negative .001 .001 .002** .001 -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001
(s.e.) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Positive -.001 -.001** -.001 -.001** .002** .001 .002* .001
(.000) (.000) (.001) (.000) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
JumpSize .154*** .149*** .180*** .190***
(.021) (.020) (.015) (.015)
Articles .000 .000* .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.003) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Neg − Pos .002* .002** .003** .002* -.003** -.002** -.003* -.002
(s.e.) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
R2 .098 .229 .121 .235 .141 .237 .140 .243
Observations 44,722 44,722 44,722 44,722 44,722 44,722 44,722 44,722
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the probability of selling pressure from retail investors is increased by between 2 and 10
percentage points. This finding supports the use of ESS as a proxy for the initial signal
described in the model.
In addition to being related to retail trading, ESS should also be related to prices moving
away from fundamental value. This relationship is investigated using techniques similar to
equation (4.2) and examining price movements around earnings announcements:
Underit = β1Negativeit−1 + β2Positiveit−1 + β3Xit + ζi + φt + εit. (4.3)
In this setup, Under equals one when a stock experiences a price jump above 25% at its
earnings announcement.2 Thus, Under indicates undervaluation, or scenarios where prices
jump upward to reflect the new fundamental information provided in the earnings announce-
ment. The Negative and Positive variables have been previously described. However, in
this test they are lagged such that they measure news sentiment in a four week period, but
do not include the two weeks immediately prior to the earnings announcement. The X ma-
trix contains similar control variables to the previous tests, with the addition of JumpSize,
which is the absolute value of the earnings announcement price jump.
If ESS is a reasonably proxy for the initial signal, negative sentiment should increase
the probability that stocks will be undervalued while positive sentiment will decrease that
probability. Thus, following equation (4.3), β1 should be greater than β2. This would indi-
cate that when compared to positive sentiment, negative sentiment increases the probability
of undervaluation. Results are shown in Panel B of Table 4.1. The results show that when
compared to positive sentiment, negative sentiment increases (decreases) the probability of
undervaluation (overvaluation). These results hold whether measuring earnings announce-
ment returns using raw returns or abnormal returns.3
2Defining Under using jumps between 20% and 50% provide similar results.
3In Panel B of Table 4.1, Over is the opposite of Under.
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Together, finding that ESS derived from RavenPack is related to both retail trading and
mispricing provides support for its use as a proxy for the model’s initial signal, Sη.
Section 4.2. Information Acquisition and the Sentiment of Recent News - Ro-
bustness
Table 3.1 tests the differential effect of negative and positive sentiment on institutional
information acquisition using contemporaneous measures of ESS and Learning. In other
words, in the monthly setting Learning and ESS were both measured in the same month.
However, it could be the case that learning takes place at the beginning of the month
while news articles cluster near the end of the month. Also, it could be the case that
information acquisition is driving news sentiment, not the other way around. To control
for these hypotheticals, the tests from Table 3.1 are repeated using lagged ESS. That is,
equation (3.1) is amended by using Negative and Positive from period t − 1. As can be
seen in the first four columns of Table 4.2, similar results are obtained. Column (2) shows
that mutual funds increase their requests relative to hedge funds by almost 3 requests when
news sentiment is negative, which is an increase of 6%. Thus, it can be said that negative
sentiment in April leads mutual funds to acquire relatively more information in May.
Also in Table 3.1, ESS of 50 was considered neutral. However, average ESS over the
sample is 52, suggesting that 52 instead of 50 may better indicate neutral sentiment. With
this in mind, the last four columns of Table 4.2 show results from measuring Negative and
Positive considering ESS scores of 52 as neutral. As can be seen, the results hold and
Prediction 1 is again confirmed.
Recall that Negative and Positive have been defined as news sentiment at least three
units away from neutral. It could be the case that other cutoffs provide better definitions of
negative and positive news sentiment. Table 4.3 reproduces the results from Table 3.1 while
using cutoffs of two and four units away. The results are quantitatively and qualitatively
similar to those presented in Table 3.1.
RavenPack measures how relevant news releases are to a given stock, with their relevance
metric ranging from zero to 100. Relevance has not been considered in the results presented
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Table 4.2: Information Acquisition and the Sentiment of Recent News - Lags and Neutral
This table presents results from testing the relationship between information acquisition and the sentiment of recent news while
accounting for lagged news and using a different value for neutral. The tests use the regression model in equation (3.1). Odd-
numbered columns utilize the monthly setup. Even-numbered columns define t as the 30 days prior to an earnings announcement
date. The dependent variable, Diff is measured with either Requests or IPs. The variable ESSit captures the sentiment of
recent news regarding stock i during period t. In the first four columns, ESS is measured similar to Table 3.1, but is lagged
one period, thus ESSit−1 is used to derive Negative and Positive. In the last four columns, ESS is used contemporaneously,
but 52 instead of 50 is considered neutral sentiment. ESS is measured using the median sentiment rating from RavenPack.
For columns (1) through (4), the indicator variable Negative takes on the value of one if ESS ≤ 47 and the indicator variable
Positive takes on the value of one if ESS ≥ 53. For columns (5) through (8), the indicator variable Negative takes on the value
of one if ESS ≤ 49 and the indicator variable Positive takes on the value of one if ESS ≥ 55. The table presents Neg−Pos as
a test of whether negative and positive news induce differential information acquisition. The matrix Xit contains the natural
logarithm of the following control variables: the number of news releases (Articles), total trading volume (V olume), average
market capitalization over the time period (not shown), the number of owning institutional investors (No. Inst.), and total
institutional ownership of shares (Inst. Own.). The X matrix also contains the average daily price volatility over the period
(V olatility) and indicator variables for whether period t contains or corresponds to stock i’s quarterly or annual filings. Stock
and year-month fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by stock and year-month. The sample is made up of
approximately 3,300 stocks and 66 months.
Lagged ESS Neutral ESS = 52
Requests IPs Requests IPs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Negative -0.85 0.69 0.14 0.19 3.52*** 5.83*** 1.24*** 1.72***
(s.e.) (0.66) (0.75) (0.12) (0.14) (0.77) (1.53) (0.16) (0.24)
Positive -0.58 -2.11*** -0.41*** -0.31** -3.28*** -2.93** -0.81*** -1.11***
(0.54) (0.67) (0.08) (0.12) (0.63) (1.40) (0.12) (0.21)
Articles 4.62*** 1.95*** 1.35*** 0.56*** 4.26*** 6.11*** 1.26*** 1.64***
(0.39) (0.28) (0.08) (0.05) (0.38) (0.60) (0.09) (0.10)
V olume 5.21*** 3.60*** 1.47*** 1.05*** 4.44*** 4.98*** 1.25*** 1.29***
(0.51) (0.43) (0.12) (0.08) (0.45) (0.50) (0.10) (0.09)
No. Inst. 1.01 1.33 0.13 -0.01 0.91 1.14 0.04 -0.03
(1.11) (1.07) (0.21) (0.22) (0.99) (1.15) (0.19) (0.18)
Inst. Own. -0.53 -0.68 -0.23* 0.01 -0.22 -0.48 -0.15 -0.03
(0.64) (0.53) (0.12) (0.11) (0.55) (0.56) (0.10) (0.09)
V olatility -1.04*** -0.38* -0.21*** -0.02 -0.91*** -0.68** -0.19*** -0.07
(0.25) (0.20) (0.06) (0.04) (0.23) (0.27) (0.05) (0.05)
Neg − Pos -0.27 2.80** 0.55*** 0.51** 6.79*** 8.76*** 2.05*** 2.82***
(s.e.) (0.86) (1.21) (0.15) (0.21) (1.20) (2.62) (0.23) (.395)
R2 .566 .507 .797 .770 .568 .601 .799 .820
Observations 127,116 39,352 127,116 39,352 141,146 48,782 141,146 48,782
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Table 4.3: Information Acquisition and the Sentiment of Recent News - Cutoffs
This table presents results from testing the relationship between information acquisition and the sentiment of recent news while
using various cutoffs to define Negative and Positive. The tests use the regression model in equation (3.1). Odd-numbered
columns utilize the monthly setup. Even-numbered columns define t as the 30 days prior to an earnings announcement date.
The dependent variable, Diff is measured with either Requests or IPs. The variable ESSit captures the sentiment of recent
news regarding stock i during period t. ESS is measured using the median sentiment rating from RavenPack. The indicator
variable Negative takes on the value of one if ESS ≤ 50 − C. The indicator variable Positive takes on the value of one if
ESS ≥ 50+C. The first four columns use C = 2 while the last four columns use C = 4 as the cutoffs between negative, neutral,
and positive sentiment. The table presents Neg − Pos as a test of whether negative and positive news induce differential
information acquisition. The matrix Xit contains the natural logarithm of the following control variables: the number of
news releases (Articles), total trading volume (V olume), average market capitalization over the time period (not shown), the
number of owning institutional investors (No. Inst.), and total institutional ownership of shares (Inst. Own.). The X matrix
also contains the average daily price volatility over the period (V olatility) and indicator variables for whether period t contains
or corresponds to stock i’s quarterly or annual filings. Stock and year-month fixed effects are included. Standard errors are
clustered by stock and year-month. The sample is made up of approximately 3,300 stocks and 66 months.
Cutoff = 2 Cutoff = 4
Requests IPs Requests IPs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Negative 0.44 3.72*** 0.57*** 0.99*** 1.80** 5.03*** 0.84*** 1.16***
(s.e.) (0.72) (1.37) (0.16) (0.22) (0.76) (1.52) (0.16) (0.25)
Positive -0.03 -1.40 -0.01 -0.36** -2.49*** -2.60** -0.60*** -0.71***
(0.64) (0.99) (0.10) (0.15) (0.60) (1.14) (0.09) (0.18)
Articles 4.31*** 6.17*** 1.27*** 1.66*** 4.28*** 6.17*** 1.27*** 1.66***
(0.38) (0.60) (0.09) (0.10) (0.38) (0.60) (0.09) (0.10)
V olume 4.45*** 5.01*** 1.25*** 1.29*** 4.45*** 5.00*** 1.25*** 1.29***
(0.45) (0.50) (0.10) (0.09) (0.45) (0.50) (0.11) (0.09)
No. Inst. 0.87 1.15 0.03 -0.03 0.91 1.16 0.04 -0.03
(0.99) (1.15) (0.19) (0.19) (0.98) (1.15) (0.19) (0.18)
Inst. Own. -0.23 -0.50 -0.15 -0.04 -0.23 -0.51 -0.15 -0.04
(0.55) (0.56) (0.10) (0.09) (0.55) (0.56) (0.10) (0.09)
V olatility -0.94*** -0.69** -0.19*** -0.08 -0.92*** -0.68** -0.19*** -0.07
(0.23) (0.27) (0.05) (0.05) (0.23) (0.27) (0.05) (0.05)
Neg − Pos 0.47 5.12** 0.58*** 1.36*** 4.29*** 7.63*** 1.44*** 1.87***
(s.e.) (1.16) (2.07) (0.21) (0.33) (1.17) (2.36) (0.20) (0.38)
R2 .568 .601 .799 .820 .568 .601 .799 .820
Observations 141,146 48,782 141,146 48,782 141,146 48,782 141,146 48,782
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thus far. Table 4.4 takes relevance into account by limiting the set of news articles to those
with relevance scores of at least 80 or 90. The results shown in Table 4.4 are qualitatively
unchanged from Table 3.1.
It may be the case that the relationship between news sentiment and information acquisi-
tion is different based on the size of the stock. It may also be the case that the results found
in the previous tables are driven by one subset of stocks, either small or large. To explore
these ideas, Table 4.5 provides results using size-based subsamples. Large, small, and micro
stocks are identified using the NYSE Breakpoints following Fama and French (2012). The
relationship between information acquisition and sentiment holds within each subsample.
Finally, in unreported results the same tests were repeated using different years within the
2012 through 2017 period and by measuring ESS using mean instead of median sentiment
scores. In all cases, the results hold and provide the same qualitative interpretations as Table
3.1. Overall, the finding that mutual funds acquire relatively more information than hedge
funds when sentiment is negative is robust.
Section 4.3. Price Informativeness - Robustness
Similar to the previous section, the robustness checks from Section 4.2 have been applied
to the results in Table 3.2, and again, the main findings hold. To further test the price
informativeness predictions and the findings in Table 3.2, this section uses Requests as
the measure of Learning. Table 4.6 recreates Table 3.2 using Requests instead of IPs.
The results hold: increased learning by either hedge funds or mutual funds improves price
informativeness. As relatively more mutual funds become informed compared to hedge
funds, PJR and PJ are reduced. This finding provides additional support to Prediction 3.
Furthermore, Table 4.6 shows that price jumps are lower following negative sentiment than
following positive; providing additional support for Prediction 2.
Price jumps have also been analyzed within size-based subsamples. Table 4.7 shows that
the previous findings generally hold for large, small, and micro stocks. Indeed, prices are
between 11% and 15% more informative following negative sentiment than positive.
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Table 4.4: Information Acquisition and the Sentiment of Recent News - Relevance
This table presents results from testing the relationship between information acquisition and the sentiment of recent news while
accounting for the relevance of news. The tests use the regression model in equation (3.1). Odd-numbered columns utilize
the monthly setup. Even-numbered columns define t as the 30 days prior to an earnings announcement date. The dependent
variable, Diff is measured with either Requests or IPs. The variable ESSit captures the sentiment of recent news regarding
stock i during period t. In the first four columns, only news items with a relevance score of 80 or more are used to measures ESS.
In the last four columns, only news with relevance of greater than 90 are used. ESS is measured using the median sentiment
rating from RavenPack. The indicator variable Negative takes on the value of one if ESS ≤ 47. The indicator variable
Positive takes on the value of one if ESS ≥ 53. The table presents Neg− Pos as a test of whether negative and positive news
induce differential information acquisition. The matrix Xit contains the natural logarithm of the following control variables:
the number of news releases (Articles), total trading volume (V olume), average market capitalization over the time period (not
shown), the number of owning institutional investors (No. Inst.), and total institutional ownership of shares (Inst.Own.). The
X matrix also contains the average daily price volatility over the period (V olatility) and indicator variables for whether period
t contains or corresponds to stock i’s quarterly or annual filings. Stock and year-month fixed effects are included. Standard
errors are clustered by stock and year-month. The sample is made up of approximately 3,300 stocks and 66 months.
Relevance ≥ 80 Relevance ≥ 90
Requests IPs Requests IPs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Negative 1.50** 4.07*** 0.78*** 1.10*** 1.51** 4.10*** 0.78*** 1.11***
(s.e.) (0.72) (1.43) (0.16) (0.23) (0.72) (1.43) (0.16) (0.23)
Positive -2.41*** -2.85** -0.55*** -0.74*** -2.42*** -2.83** -0.55*** -0.73***
(0.59) (1.10) (0.09) (0.17) (0.59) (1.10) (0.09) (0.17)
Articles 8.10*** 13.8*** 2.24*** 3.54*** 8.12*** 14.0*** 2.24*** 3.58***
(0.57) (1.10) (0.12) (0.19) (0.58) (1.13) (0.12) (0.19)
V olume 4.16*** 4.92*** 1.20*** 1.29*** 4.16*** 4.92*** 1.20*** 1.29***
(0.43) (0.48) (0.10) (0.09) (0.43) (0.48) (0.10) (0.09)
No. Inst. 0.84 1.27 0.03 0.01 0.83 1.24 0.03 -0.00
(0.98) (1.16) (0.19) (0.19) (0.98) (1.16) (0.19) (0.19)
Inst. Own. -0.22 -0.61 -0.15 -0.07 -0.22 -0.61 -0.15 -0.07
(0.55) (0.56) (0.10) (0.09) (0.55) (0.56) (0.10) (0.09)
V olatility -1.05*** -0.86*** -0.22*** -0.12** -1.06*** -0.88*** -0.23*** -0.13**
(0.23) (0.27) (0.05) (0.05) (0.23) (0.27) (0.05) (0.05)
Neg − Pos 3.91*** 6.91*** 1.32*** 1.83*** 3.92*** 6.94*** 1.33*** 1.84***
(s.e.) (1.08) (2.24) (0.19) (0.35) (1.08) (2.24) (0.19) (0.35)
R2 .570 .603 .802 .822 .570 .603 .802 .822















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.6: Price Informativeness - Requests
This table presents results from testing whether information acquisition and the sentiment of recent news are related to price
informativeness. The tests use the regression model in equation (3.3). Odd-numbered columns use PJR as the dependent vari-
able while even-numbered columns use PJ . Learning is measured using Requests and is lagged one period in all specifications.
ESS is measured using the median sentiment rating from RavenPack. The indicator variable Negative takes on the value of
one if ESS ≤ 47. The indicator variable Positive takes on the value of one if ESS ≥ 53. The table presents Neg − Pos as
a test of whether negative and positive news induce differential price informativeness. The matrix Xit contains the natural
logarithm of the following control variables: the number of news releases (Articles), total trading volume (V olume), average
market capitalization over the time period (not shown), the number of owning institutional investors (No. Inst.), and total
institutional ownership of shares (Inst. Own.). The X matrix also contains the average daily price volatility over the period
(V olatility) and indicator variables for whether period t contains or corresponds to stock i’s quarterly or annual filings. Stock
and year-month fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by stock and year-month. The sample is made up of
approximately 3,300 stocks and 66 months.
Price Jumps
Mutual Funds Hedge Funds Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Learning -.013*** -.041*** -.006* -.028*** -.0002*** -.001***
(s.e.) (.003) (.008) (.003) (.006) (.0001) (.000)
Negative -.022* -.079*** -.022* -.079*** -.023** -.081***
(.011) (.026) (.011) (.026) (.011) (.026)
Positive .018 .064*** .018 .065*** .018* .064***
(.011) (.019) (.011) (.019) (.011) (.019)
Articles -.019*** -.047*** -.019*** -.048*** -.019*** -.050***
(.004) (.009) (.004) (.009) (.004) (.009)
V olume -.051*** .036*** -.052*** .034** -.053*** .030**
(.006) (.013) (.006) (.013) (.006) (.013)
No. Inst. -.017 .073** -.017 .070** -.017 .073**
(.017) (.034) (.017) (.033) (.017) (.033)
Inst. Own. .018* -.017 .018* -.017 .018* -.017
(.010) (.017) (.010) (.017) (.010) (.017)
V olatility .000 .098*** .000 .098*** .000 .098***
(.003) (.007) (.003) (.007) (.003) (.007 )
Neg − Pos -.040** -.143*** -.040** -.143*** -.041** -.146***
(s.e.) (.018) (.037) (.018) (.037) (.018) (.037)
R2 .304 .233 .304 .232 .304 .232
Observations 10,613 39,643 10,613 39,643 10,613 39,643
47
Table 4.7: Price Informativeness - NYSE Breakpoints
This table presents results from testing whether information acquisition and the sentiment of recent news are related to price
informativeness when measured using price jumps at earnings announcements and partitioning the sample by size using NYSE
Breakpoints. Panel A uses large stocks only. Panel B uses small stocks. Panel C uses micro stocks. The tests use the regression
model in equation (3.3). Odd-numbered columns use Requests and the Learning variable. Even-numbered columns use IPs.
Learning is lagged one period in all specifications. The dependent variable, PJ , measures price informativeness. ESS is
measured using the median sentiment rating from RavenPack. The indicator variable Negative takes on the value of one if
ESS ≤ 47. The indicator variable Positive takes on the value of one if ESS ≥ 47. The table presents Neg − Pos as a test of
whether negative and positive news induce differential price informativeness. The matrix Xit contains the natural logarithm
of the following control variables: the number of news releases (Articles), total trading volume (V olume), average market
capitalization over the time period (not shown), the number of owning institutional investors (No.Inst.), and total institutional
ownership of shares (Inst.Own.). The X matrix also contains the average daily price volatility over the period (V olatility) and
indicator variables for whether period t contains or corresponds to stock i’s quarterly or annual filings. Stock and year-month
fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by stock and year-month. The sample is made up of approximately
3,300 stocks and 66 months.
Panel A. Large Stocks
Mutual Funds Hedge Funds Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Learning -.059*** -.103*** .022* .036 -.000 -.003*
(s.e.) (.016) (.026) (.012) (.022) (.000) (.002)
Negative -.073* -.073* -.073* -.073* -.081** -.081**
(.041) (.040) (.041) (.041) (.040) (.040)
Positive .060* .061* .062* .062* .071** .070**
(.035) (.035) (.035) (.035) (.035) (.035)
Neg − Pos -.133** -.134** -.134** -.135** -.152** -.151**
(s.e.) (.062) (.062) (.062) (.062) (.062) (.062)
Panel B. Small Stocks
Learning -.001 -.006 .002 -.013 -.001* -.010***
(s.e.) (.014) (.022) (.012) (.024) (.001) (.003)
Negative -.110** -.110** -.110** -.109** -.095** -.093**
(.042) (.042) (.042) (.042) (.043) (.043)
Positive .021 .021 .021 .021 .024 .023
(.037) (.037) (.037) (.037) (.035) (.035)
Neg − Pos -.131* -.130* -.131* -.130* -.118* -.116*
(s.e.) .070 .070 .069 .069 .067 .067
Panel C. Micro Stocks
Learning -.023 -.050** -.007 -.032 -.002*** -.011***
(s.e.) (.015) (.022) (.011) (.022) (.001) (.004)
Negative -.058 -.058 -.059 -.059 -.070* -.070*
(.040) (.040) (.040) (.040) (.038) (.038)
Positive .057 .057 .058 .058 .056 .056
(.036) (.036) (.036) (.036) (.035) (.035)
Neg − Pos -.114* -.114* -.117* -.117* -.126** -.127**
(s.e.) .059 .059 .059 .059 .057 .058
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Section 4.4. Information Acquisition and Other Investors - Robustness
The robustness checks from the previous section have been applied to the results in Table
3.3. The results quantitatively and qualitatively remain unchanged. Table 3.3 defines Low
and High as the lower and upper quartiles, deciles, and terciles of expected learning by
other investors. Upon observing Table 3.3, it could be said that the results are stronger
when using a more strict definition of Low and High (i.e., when using deciles instead of
quartiles or terciles). However, the main takeaway is that the results remain qualitatively
the same. That is, when it comes to acquiring information, hedge funds care more about
what mutual funds are doing than vice versa.
As another robustness check and to further study Prediction 4, the analysis is repeated
on sized-based subsamples. The results in Table 4.8 show that the relationship described in
Prediction 4 is strongest among large and small stocks.
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Table 4.8: Information Acquisition and Other Investors - NYSE Breakpoints
This table presents results from testing whether hedge funds and mutual funds condition their information acquisition on
expected learning from their each other and partitions the sample by size using NYSE Breakpoints. Panel A uses large stocks
only. Panel B uses small stocks. Panel C uses micro stocks. The tests utilize the regression model in equation (3.5) to calculate
the expected level of other investor type learning. Then the regression model in equation (3.6) is used to test whether investors
learn more when it is expected that the other investor type will learn less. Odd-numbered columns define t in monthly terms.
Even-numbered columns define t as the time period 15 days prior to an earnings announcement date while t− 1 corresponds to
15 day period just prior to t. The dependent variables Learningh and Learningm are measured using either Requests or IPs.
The matrix Xit contains the natural logarithm of the following control variables: the number of news releases (Articles), total
trading volume (V olume), average market capitalization over the time period (not shown), the number of owning institutional
investors (No. Inst.), and total institutional ownership of shares (Inst. Own.). The X matrix also contains the average daily
price volatility over the period (V olatility) and indicator variables for whether period t contains or corresponds to stock i’s
quarterly or annual filings. Low is equal to one when learning from the other investor type for a given stock is predicted
to be in the lower quartile. High is equal to one when learning from the other investor type for a given stock is predicted
to be in the upper quartile. The table presents Low − High as a test of whether low expected learning from others results
in different information acquisition than when learning from others is expected to be high. The control variables contained
in Y include Negative, Positive, and X. Stock and year-month fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by
stock and year-month and the Murphy-Topel correction has been applied for predicted regressors. The sample is made up of
approximately 3,300 stocks and 66 months.
Panel A. Large Stocks
Mutual Funds Hedge Funds
Requests IPs Requests IPs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Low .016 .020 .030 .070** .380** .346*** .323*** .330***
(s.e.) (.032) (.047) (.021) (.028) (.145) (.107) (.091) (.071)
High -.055 -.044 .013 -.018 -.083 -.128 -.127** -.163**
(.036) (.049) (.030) (.040) (.081) (.112) (.054) (.062)
Low −High .071 .064 .017 .089* .463*** .474*** .450*** .493***
(s.e.) (.052) (.062) (.038) (.047) (.164) (.154) (.103) (.090)
R2 .677 .626 .783 .742 .588 .565 .698 .656
Observations 42,473 13,956 42,473 13,956 42,473 13,956 42,473 13,956
Panel B. Small Stocks
Low -.016 .018 .026 .040 .254** .292** .207*** .190**
(s.e.) (.027) (.047) (.018) (.031) (.121) (.123) (.078) (.078)
High .010 .042 .018 -.023 -.046 -.052 -.061 -.078
(.032) (.052) (.023) (.039) (.084) (.107) (.038) (.059)
Low −High -.026 -.024 .008 .063 .300** .344*** .268*** .268***
(s.e.) (.042) (.070) (.030) (.047) (.144) (.167) (.086) (.092)
R2 .564 .494 .664 .587 .523 .502 .601 .565
Observations 37,838 11,926 37,838 11,926 37,838 11,926 37,838 11,926
Panel C. Micro Stocks
Low .039 .123*** .048** .093*** .257*** .136 .184*** .125***
(s.e.) (.024) (.032) (.020) (.025) (.075) (.084) (.042) (.046)
High .003 -.028 -.013 -.046 .025 .088 -.038 -.031
(.027) (.040) (.021) (.030) (.049) (.067) (.025) (.037)
Low −High .035 .152*** .061** .138*** .232** .048 .223*** .157***
(s.e.) (.038) (.054) (.031) (.040) (.092) (.106) (.050) (.058)
R2 .575 .496 .649 .571 .468 .450 .504 .470
Observations 48,900 13,480 48,900 13,480 48,900 13,480 48,900 13,480
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
This paper extends the classic Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) setting to explore the in-
teraction between short-sale prohibitions and information acquisition. When news gener-
ates differences of opinions, constrained investors will be relatively optimistic or pessimistic.
When relatively pessimistic, they expect to be bound by their short-sale prohibition. Fewer
constrained investors acquire costly information in this scenario since they anticipate being
unable to trade. In response, more unconstrained investors acquire information.
The model makes several unique predictions. First, relative to hedge funds, fewer mutual
funds acquire information following news with positive sentiment than following news with
negative sentiment. Second, hedge fund information acquisition is more sensitive to the
information acquisition of mutual funds than vice versa. Third, since the informativeness
of prices depends on information acquisition, the model also highlights a link between the
sentiment of recent news and the information content of prices: prices are more informative
following negative sentiment than following positive sentiment.
A new dataset is employed to verify the model’s predictions. This dataset was derived
from records of activity on the EDGAR filing system and a hand-collected sample of IP
addresses from hedge funds and mutual funds. Using direct measures of mutual fund and
hedge fund information acquisition, tests verify that relatively more mutual fund’s acquire
information following news with negative sentiment than positive. Also, the data show that
hedge funds are more sensitive to the information acquisition of mutual funds than vice versa.
Finally, tests verify that prices are more informative when more information is acquired and
when the sentiment of recent news has been negative.
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Overall, this paper highlights an important link between short-sale prohibitions and in-
formation acquisition. Namely, in the presence of short sale prohibited investors, information
acquisition is conditional on the sentiment of recent news.
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APPENDIX A: UPDATING BY UNINFORMED MUTUAL FUNDS AND
HEDGE FUNDS
Deriving E[θ|P ] entails following the logic developed in Section 2.2. The uninformed do
not know which regime will obtain, but they do know that there are only two possibilities.
Using this insight, the uninformed can update by considering being in either regime, and
accounting for the probability that either one obtains.
Being in this Regime 1 means (i) informed mutual funds demand positive shares and (ii)
informed mutual funds believe the asset to be undervalued. The observable signal, denoted
here by Sin, can be derived from equation (2.6) by removing the maximization function since





















using equations (2.9) and (2.10):
S1 =
[
P (νµ+ ωδ)− Sinγ
][









= θ + Z1. (A.2)




















Notably, Z1 contains only two unknowns, α and u. These two variables are indepen-
dent normal random variables and are combined additively after being multiplied by known
scalars. As such, Z1 is a mean-zero normal random variable with precision τ1. To see τ1,
rewrite equation (A.3) using scalars A and B:
Z1 = Aα +Bu. (A.4)
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Since A and B are known and α and u are independent normal random variables, the









Being in Regime 2 means (i) informed mutual funds do not trade and (ii) informed
mutual funds believe the asset to be overvalued. The observable signal, denoted here by
Sout, can be written from equation (2.6) by replacing the maximization function with zero


















= θ + Z2. (A.7)












Uninformed investors observe only one signal from the price, S = Sin = Sout. However,
they can transform this signal into two different refined signals, S1 and S2. Uninformed
investors cannot simply use the refined signal from the regime that is more likely, since there
remains some probability that the observable signal comes from the less-likely regime. Up-





to both regimes. Indeed, the goal of understanding the price’s signal to uninformed investors
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The joint density of θ and P can be expanded to recognize that the price can exist under
two regimes:
f(θ, P ) = f(θ, P,E[θ|Sα, P ] > P )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Regime 1
+f(θ, P,E[θ|Sα, P ] ≤ P )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Regime 2
. (A.11)
To explicitly write out the density functions comprising equation (A.11), note that each
contains three random variables that remain unknown to the uninformed, θ, α, and u. The
joint density of the payoff, the price, and the realization of Regime 1, for example, is the
probability that θ, α, and u combine such that a given θ is observed, Regime 1 is realized,
and a given price is obtained (equivalent to S1 being observed). This joint probability density
can be written as follows:




This density can be understood as follows: First, take the probability of obtaining any
given payoff, fθ(θ). For every payoff there exists infinite combinations of α and u that
produce the observed price (or S1) and Regime 1. Thus, the density function integrates over
every possible combination by integrating over every possible α. For every (θ, α) pair, the
probability that Regime 1 obtains is equivalent to the probability that u is below a certain
threshold, denoted ũ, which is the cutoff point between regimes. That is, ũ is the value at
which E[θ|Sα, P ] = P . Finally, for every (θ, α) pair, there exists only one possible u that will
produce the observed S1 in Regime 1. When matched with the (θ, α) pair, u1 is the value
that produces the S1 observed.
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The joint density of the payoff, the price, and the realization of Regime 2 can be written
in similar fashion:




The joint density of the payoff and the price can be seen by combining equations (A.12)
and (A.13):





Fu(ũ)fu(u1) + [1− Fu(ũ)]fu(u2)
]
dα. (A.14)
Finally, the marginal density of the price, needed in the denominator of equation (A.10),
can be found by integrating equation (A.14) over θ. Thus, using equations (A.10) through
(A.14), uninformed investors can update their beliefs using the price.
The variables used in equation (A.14) are derived below. As noted, u1 is the value that
when combined with a given θ and α produces S1. Recall, equation (A.2) shows that S1 is
the sum of θ with Z1. Using this identity combined with the derivation of Z1 in equation
(A.3), u1 can be written as follows:
u1 =
[
θ − S1 + α
( ωδτα
(νµ+ ωδ)(τα + τI) + νµτθ
)][(νµ+ ωδ)(τα + τI) + νµτθ






Similarly, u2 is the value that when combined with a given θ produces S2. Using equations







Finally, ũ is the cutoff point between Regime 1 and Regime 2. That is, ũ is the value
that when combined with θ and α equates the price with E[θ|Sα, P ]. The complete form of
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APPENDIX B: UPDATING BY INFORMED MUTUAL FUNDS
At the trading stage, informed mutual funds have observed the initial signal (Sη), the
noisy signal (Sα), and the price, thus they know their own demand as well as the demand
from retail investors and the uninformed. Informed mutual funds remain uncertain, how-
ever, regarding the demand from informed hedge funds and noisy supply. With this in mind,
informed mutual funds consider what they know upon receipt of the price to form an observ-
able signal. They produce this signal by rearranging the market clearing condition according
to what they know and what remains unknown:
−ν(1− µ)XHP − ωδXMS − ω(1− δ)XMP −XR︸ ︷︷ ︸
Known/Observable
= νµXHθ − u︸ ︷︷ ︸
Unknown
. (B.1)
This signal can by refined by expanding the optimal demand function of informed hedge
funds into known and unknown elements:
SI =
(












Informed mutual funds can transform the price into a signal that is the sum of θ and







τθ + τα + τI
, (B.3)





APPENDIX C: STEPS IN NUMERICAL SIMULATION
Numerical simulation is required to solve for equilibrium learning and produce compar-
ative statics. The steps to solve for equilibrium are detailed below. The parameters used in
the simulation are summarized in Table ??.
1. Set model parameters (i.e., masses, precisions, and costs). Fix δ and pick an initial
signal, Sη.
2. Make a conjecture for the portion of informed hedge funds in equilibrium, µ.
3. Draw a random triplet, (θ, α, u) and conjecture a market clearing price. Compute
updated beliefs from the price using equations (2.7) and (2.9). Compute optimal
demands using equation (2.2). Alter the price conjecture until the market clearing price
has been found (i.e., equation (2.3) holds). Repeat this step 10, 000 times, collecting
the realized profits for each investor type using equation (2.1). Compute the average
difference in realized profits between informed and uninformed hedge funds.
4. Repeat Steps 2 and 3, altering the µ conjecture, until the average profit differential
is equal to κθ (i.e., enforce hedge funds’ indifference condition, equation (2.4a)). The
resultant µ represents the optimal portion of informed hedge funds given the parameters
chosen in Step 1.
5. Repeat Steps 1 through 4 over a grid of δ values ranging from zero to one. For each δ,
collect the average profit differential between informed and uninformed mutual funds
which is the numerical equivalent to the left-hand side of equation (2.4b). Select δ?
from the grid of δ values. If the average profit differential from each δ is larger than
κα then δ
? = 1. If the average profit differential from each δ is smaller than κα then
δ? = 0. If neither of the previous cases fit, δ? is selected as the δ which produces
the average profit differential nearest to κα. The µ from Step 4 and δ
? from this step
constitute equilibrium, (µ?, δ?).
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Table C.1: Summary of Simulation Parameters
This table summarizes the simulation parameters used to provide the figures shown in this paper. The simulation process is
summarized in Section 2.2 of the text and is more detailed in the Appendix.
Parameter Symbol Values
Mass of Hedge Funds ν 1.00
Mass of Mutual Funds ω 1.00
Precision of Payoff τθ 1.00− 3.00
Precision of Initial Signal τη 1.00− 3.00
Precision of Noisy Signal τα 1.00− 3.00
Precision of Noisy Supply τu 1.00− 3.00
Inventory Holding Cost Parameter γ 1.15− 2.00
Cost to Observe θ κθ 0.10− 0.40
Cost to Observe Sα κα 0.025− 0.10
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APPENDIX D: DATA SOURCES AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
The EDGAR log files contain records of requests from masked IP addresses to view filings
within the SEC’s EDGAR database. An example of data from the log files is found in Panel
A of Table D.1. While the fourth octet of every IP address has been masked with a random
set of three letters, the IP address can nevertheless be linked to investments firms using
the first three octets. This is due to the fact that organizations typically register blocks
of IP addresses, with the most common block containing 256 IPs. All 256 IP addresses
usually have the same first three octets. Thus, investment firms that have acquired blocks
of IP addresses are not fully masked by the randomized fourth octet. Using historical IP
address records from MaxMind, many investment firms and their activity on EDGAR are
identifiable. As an example, Panel B of Table D.1 shows that the masked IP addresses in
Panel A can be linked to actual investment firms.
A summary of the data derived from the EDGAR log files is provided in Table D.2. Also
included in Table D.2 is a summary of the RavenPack data. The RavenPack data is used to
measure ESS, which is calculated as the median event sentiment score from all articles on
RavenPack over a given time period, with 50 indicating neutral sentiment.
Data on stock returns, market capitalization, and trading volume has been acquired
from CRSP. Weller (2017) has been followed in order to calculate price jump ratios using
returns from CRSP. The TAQ dataset has been used to measure trading volumes and to
calculate buy-sell ratios. Earnings announcement dates and other stock-level information has
been acquired from Compustat. Institutional ownership data has been taken from Thomson
Reuters. The SEC’s MIDAS data has been used to measure trading and quote-cancellation
activity.
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Table D.1: EDGAR Log File Example
This table shows an example of the data contained in the EDGAR log files. Panel A shows the data as it appears in raw form.
Panel B shows an example of how the data appears after investment firms have been unmasked and after filings have been
specified.
Panel A. Example of EDGAR Log Files
IP Address Date Time CIK Accession
154.61.131.ecg 20170531 09:47:33 051143 000104746917001061
205.173.24.fhf 20170531 11:07:28 274191 000002741917000008
216.230.48.igg 20170924 12:27:02 320193 000032019317000009
165.71.0.aah 20170924 16:12:55 831259 000083125917000016
Panel B. Example of Unmasked EDGAR Log Files
Investment Firm Date Time Ticker Filing
Dodge & Cox 20170531 09:47:33 IBM 10-K for 2016
Eaton Vance 20170531 11:07:28 TGT 10-K for 2016
American Century 20170924 12:27:02 AAPL 10-Q for Q2 2017
John Hancock 20170924 16:12:55 FCX Earnings for Q2 2017
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Table D.2: Summary of EDGAR Log Files, Stocks, and RavenPack
This table provides summary statistics for the activity of mutual funds and hedge funds in the EDGAR log files and for the
RavenPack data. Between the 444 investment firms unmasked, a total of 17.9 million requests from EDGAR have been observed.
Panel A summarized the unmasked institutions and their activity on EDGAR. Panel B summarizes institutional activity on
EDGAR at the stock level. The variables in Panel B measure the average activity for stocks either monthly or in the 30 days
leading up to earnings announcements (EA Date). The figures in parentheses in Panel B are averages for large stocks only. The
RavenPack data consists of almost 19 million news items for over the sample of 3,300 stocks. Panel C shows a summary of the
RavenPack data. For example, the average stock has 56 news items per month and a median event sentiment score (ESS) of
52.68.
Panel A. Institutions, Stocks, and EDGAR Activity
Number
Mutual Fund Companies 171 (80% of AUM; 66% of total funds)
Hedge Fund Companies 273
Stocks 3,375 (58% large/small; 42% micro)
Months 66 (Jan. 2012 - June 2017)
EA Dates 48,782
Total Requests 17,912,730
Total Requests prior to EA Date 3,365,703
Panel B. Stock-Level EDGAR Activity
Mean
Mutual Funds Difference
Monthly Requests per Stock 28 (124) 22 (93)
EA Date Requests per Stock 59 (130) 45 (91)
Monthly IPs per Stock 8 (38) 6 (31)
EA Date IPs per Stock 17 (41) 13 (32)
Panel C. RavenPack Summary
Mean Median
No. Items per Month 56.24 24.47
No. Items per EA Date 68.79 34.00
Median ESS Monthly 52.68 52.23
Median ESS EA Date 52.60 51.92
Std. Dev. of ESS Monthly 7.57 7.19
Std. Dev. of ESS EA Date 5.40 5.22
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